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Abstract. 
The established opinion is that in the face of uncertain information on pollution control 
costs, environmental agencies cannot set levels of ambient charges enabling the reaching of 
desired concentration levels at receptor sites in a cost-effective way. Although a trial-and-error 
procedure could finally result in the attainment of concentration standards this is generally not 
cost-effective. This paper proves that environment agencies can develop adaptive procedures 
that enable the achievement of the standards at minimum costs. The proof is based on ideas of 
non-monotonic optimization. The adaptation mechanisms are applied in a case study of 
charges for acidification in the Netherlands. The results show that the iterative procedure 
approaches the cost- minimum fairly quickly but that over and undershooting may occur 
underway. The number of iterations and extent of overshooting can be reduced by using 
available knowledge on the violation of ambient concentrations at receptors and by a 
simulation of polluters responses to charges. 
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1. Introduction. 
Targets of environmental policy should be met and pollution control costs should not 
be higher than is strictly necessary. Baumol and Oates [2] argued that a uniform emission 
charge can be a cost effective instrument when the objective of the environmental authority is 
to reduce total emissions at sources to a specified target level when complete information on 
pollution control costs is given to every single firm and household. However, if the authority 
has full information on the costs of reducing emissions it will also be possible to design cost- 
effective emission standards for each individual source making it unclear why a charge should 
be preferred. The choice between the two instruments appears to be particularly important 
when the authority does not possess full information on abatement costs. Under conditions of 
cost uncertainty the dilemma seems to be that of a choice between a cost-effective but 
environmentally ineffective emission charge on the one hand and an environmentally effective 
emission standard that is cost ineffective on the other. In their article, Baumol and Oates tried 
to solve the dilemma by proposing a trial-and-error adjustment mechanism: if actual emissions 
are below, respectively above, the emission target at the initial emission charge the tax should 
be raised, respectively lowered. Baumol and Oates expect that emitters will adjust their 
emissions and that after a number of steps the target level for total emissions would be 
approached. 
A uniform emission charge for all sources will generally not be cost effective 
(Tietenberg [9],[10]). Since the contribution of different sources to concentration usually 
differs, the emission charge has to be different for each source and should be tailored to its 
location. Bohm and Russell [3] add uncertainty on costs and suggest that if there is more than 
one receptor, the authority will not be able to set the appropriate level of ambient charge to 
meet environmental standards at each receptor at minimum cost. If there is only one receptor, 
trial-and-error can be used since in this case the ratios of the (source specific) emission charges 
are equal to the transfer coefficients of the sources to the one receptor. The only action needed 
is to set an initial level and change all charges with the same percentage until the ambient 
standard is met. In case of multiple receptors, the environmental agency would have to know 
not only the transfer coefficients but also the costs of emission reduction in order to determine 
the shadow prices of each receptor. Bohrn and Russel conclude that although trial-and-error 
can result in attainment of the ambient standards at each receptor there is no guaranty that 
these standard will be met at minimal cost, if the environmental authority is uncertain about 
pollution control costs. 
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the vector of cost-effective emission 
charges can be identified. An adjustment mechanism is introduced analogous to the trial-and- 
error type of procedure suggested by Baumol and Oates. The difference is that in our paper the 
adjustment mechanism uses the difference (generally random) between actual and target 
concentrations of pollutants as a signal for the adjustment of ( emission ) charges instead of 
the gap between actual and target emissions. It will be demonstrated by way of non-monotonic 
optimization techniques that the search process converges and that the environmental authority 
is able to determine a cost effective set of emission taxes without knowledge of pollution 
control costs. 
This paper is organized in 6 Sections. Section 2 formulates the problem of setting 
emission standards and charges under the assumption that the environmental agency has 
imperfect information on pollution control costs. Section 3 then proceeds to define an 
adjustment mechanism that enables the agency to discover the cost minimizing vector of 
emission charges without perfect knowledge of the costs. It is assumed that the sources have 
perfect information. In section 4 the cost effectiveness of emission standards and emission 
charges is discussed for the case where the environmental agency not only has imperfect 
information, but costs are inherently stochastic and vary over time. Section 5 extends this 
discussion to the case of uncertainties involved in the transfer coefficients. We show that under 
conditions of cost uncertainty emission charges are environmentally effective and more cost 
effective than emission standards. If in addition to that there is uncertainty about the transfer 
coefficients, a system of pollution charges may be preferable to the emission charges. Section 
6 applies the theory in an empirical setting to illustrate how the adjustment mechanism 
functions. Conclusions are given in section 6. 
2. Deterministic Pollution Control. 
Let i = 1, ..., n be sources of emission (firms and households, regions or countries) and 
j = 1, ..., m receptors. Each polluter i emits a single pollutant at the rate xi. The emission 
vector x = (x, ,... , x,,) is mapped into concentrations at receptors by a transport equation, 
which is described by a transfer matrix H = {hi), i = 1 ,..., n, j = 1 ,..., m, where hi stands for 
the contribution made by one unit of emission of source i to the concentration of pollutants at 
point j . Ambient concentrations q, at the receptor points Q = (q, , . .. ,q,) impose constraints 
on emission rates 
C:=,xihi ~ q , ,  j=l, . . .  ,m, ( 1 )  
xi 20 , i= l ,  ..., n. ( 2 )  
The environmental authority's problem is to achieve target concentrations Q at 
minimum total cost for polluters: that is to choose the vector x = (x, , . . . , xn ) to minimize the 
total cost 
subject to constraints ( 1 )-( 2 ). 
The solution of this problem x* = (x; , . . . , x: ) defines the cost effective set of emission 
levels which can be imposed on sources as emission standards. The implementation of such a 
policy of direct regulation requires that the regulatory authority has full information on 
parameters hi,, q, and cost functions A. (x) . 
By using classical duality results Tietenberg [lo] has demonstrated that there exists a 
vector h = (A,, ..., h,) of shadow prices (taxes) at receptors which corresponds with the vector 
of cost - effective emission standards. The simple linear structure of the pollution transport 
equations allows the calculation of a vector of emission charges u,. The emission charge can 
be written as a function of transfer coefficients and the shadow prices h,, j = 1,. . . , m at the 
receptors: 
U, = hilhl +hi2h2+...+hi,h,. (4) 
If optimal emission charges u, = u,* associated with optimal h, = $ are imposed they 
will induce sources to adjust emissions in an optimal way: 
i (xi )+uixi  = ~ ( x i ) + ( ~ ~ = , h , h i , ) x i  = min , xi 2 0 
for i = 1 ,..., n, where h, = h; , j = 1 ,..., m, or y = u:. It results in the cost effective emission 
. 
x i ,  z=l ,  ..., n. 
The main question is how the environmental authority can determine the cost- 
minimizing charges without knowledge of the cost functions where there is more than one 
receptor (Bohm and Russel, [3]). In principle the authority could easily find a vector of high 
enough emission taxes to meet the target concentrations, but there is, however, no guaranty 
that the vector of emission charges is cost effective. 
3. Adjustment mechanism. 
This section describes an adjustment mechanism capable of implementing the cost- 
effective policy through the adaptation of the emission taxes in successive steps to equilibrium 
shadow prices. The proposed procedure decomposes the pollution control problem into two 
types of decision problems. The first choice problem is that of the environmental authority 
having to decide on the tax and adjust its level, given information on the discrepancy between 
actual and target concentrations. The procedure for adjusting taxes is based on non-monotonic, 
deterministic, and stochastic optimization techniques, which do not require information on the 
total cost of controlling emissions. The proof will be given that actually the environmental 
authority can concentrate only on monitoring target concentrations 
T,(x) = z:=,xih, - q j ,  j = 1 ,..., m 
without bothering about costs. The second optimization problem is that of individual cost 
minimizing polluters which choose their emission level given the emission charge that is 
imposed by the environmental agency. The formal description of the adjustment mechanism is 
the following. 
Suppose h0 = (hq ,.. . , h i )  is a vector of initial taxes on concentrations (or deposition) at 
receptor points and let hk = (g ,  ..., h:) be the vector of pollution taxes at step k of the 
adaptive process. Each polluter adjusts its emission level x,! ,i = 1, ..., n by minimizing its 
individual cost function f, (x) + ulk x at current values of pollution taxes q, j = 1,. . . ,m, which 
are translated into emission taxes ulk by the equation (4): u,! = ELl h:h, ,i = 1, ... ,n. The 
agency observes the ambient concentrations generated by the vector xk; it calculates the 
difference r, (x(h)) = zn xlkh, - q, , j = I,. . . , m between actual and target concentrations and 
#=I  
adjusts the pollution taxes in the next step according to the formula 
= max{~ ,~ :  + p k ( x n  I=! x;hj -q,)}, 
where j = 1, ..., m and k=0,1, .... The step size multiplier p, is chosen such as to ensure the 
convergence of the sequence hk , k = 0,1, ... to the optimal dual variables A* = (h; ,... , G). 
It is important to observe that the direction of the movement 
r ( x k )  = ( r1(xk)  ,..., rm(xk)) 
in (6) is a subgradient of the following, in general, nondifferentiable - function (see appendix 2). 
The minimization of y(h), h 2 0 is the dual minimax problem to the original pollution 
control problem (1)-(3). Under usual assumptions on the convexity of the functions f ;  (x) the 
minimax problem (6) is equivalent to the original problem (1)-(3). 
The Lagrange function 
of the problem (1)-(3) may be considered as an environmental indicator providing a link 
between emissions x and desired environmental quality. The shadow prices h,  convert the 
indicators T,(x) or constraints (I) to the same unit of measurement as the objective function 
(3). Indicators rj and shadow prices (taxes) A, play an essential role in the design of the tax 
adjust mechanisms that will be discussed in this section . 
The procedure (6) can be interpreted as a kind of "market system". According to this 
scheme cost minimizing polluters independently adjust emissions to the current taxes ulk 
minimizing the cost function (5). The agency learns what the current pollutions r ( x k )  are and 
reacts as Walrasian auctioneer would. If he observes an "excess demand" for available 
environmental user space ( r ,  > 0)  he will raise the price h, for users. In the other case the 
price will be lowered. Prices are a signal for users of environmental space to adjust their 
emissions accordingly 
The procedure (6) can be modified easily to include any additional a priori information 
on possible tax values. For example, if we know an upper bound h,, j = 1, ..., rn on optimal 
values q, the process (6) is modified as the following: 
If the vector h* has to belong to a convex set A, the vector of new taxes hk" is calculated as 
hk+' = Pr jA[hk + p k ~ ( h k ) ]  , k = O,I, ... ( 9 )  
wherePr j is the symbol of the projection operation on the set A : 
Pr jA [y] = arg{minlly - hl12, h E A]. 
Examples of such operation on the set h 2 0 and on hypercube 0 5 h I h are given by 
eqs. (6),(8). The main problem concerning the adjustment mechanisms (6), (8) and (9) is that 
value pk , k = 0.1,. . . can not be chosen in order to decrease the total cost xn f, (xi ) by passing 
I=' 
from xk to xk" since this function is unknown to the agency. Besides this, the implementation 
of a monotonic optimization procedure, which guarantees an improvement of the objective 
function at each adjustment step, runs into difficulties since, in general, the direction of the 
movement 1-(xk) in (6) is a subgradient of the non-differentiable function y(h) at h = hk . In 
appendix 1 we outline the proof of the theorem showing that procedures (6). (8) and (9) 
converge under rather general conditions for the values of the step size multipliers p,. Indeed 
it may be any sequence po,pl. ... such that p, 20,  xy=opk =m, for example pk = c / k ,  where 
c is a positive constant. These conditions guarantee a convergence independently of the initial 
vector of taxes hO. The procedure does not lead to monotonic improvements of total costs since 
the choice of the step size multipliers p,, p, ,.. . is based on excess concentrations ( positive or 
negative ) and not on the calculation of the total cost. Nevertheless the process enables to find 
optimal taxes (see appendix 1). We also show that the convergence takes place even for 
nonconvex functions f '  (x) , i = 1,. . . , n 
4. Imperfect information of individual sources. 
The deterministic pollution control problem discussed in section 3 assumed that the individual 
sources have accurate information on costs. An implicit assumption in section 3 was that the 
conditions determining costs remain unchanged during the whole period of adjusting the 
environmental tax. Dynamic convergence to equilibrium (9) requires only the monitoring of 
environmental indicators Tj (xk ) = xn x,! hi, - pj at emission levels xk = (x: ,...,xi), with 
1=1 
polluters minimizing costs f ;  (x) + u:x at current emission charges u: = x;, k:.hi, . 
In this section we drop the assumption of unchanged conditions. For each source the 
costs of pollution control depend on a large number of factors. Some of them are of a rather 
general kind, like weather conditions, prices of inputs; others are more specific; for example 
types of fuel and other raw material used, type and age of existing pollution control equipment, 
its state of maintenance, quality of operating personal, knowledge of available new abatement 
technology. Even in such a case sources can not predict exact values of pollution control costs. 
It will be assumed that the agency forms expectation about pollution control costs and sets out 
to minimize the expected value of aggregate pollution control costs. 
Actually the "state of the world" that affects cost will change during the adjustment 
period. We assume that the polluter is informed about the current local conditions and 
minimizes his costs given his certain information about factors affecting the cost-function. We 
shall show that in the face of these assumptions the decentralized strategy of emission taxes 
results in lower expected total pollution control costs than the centralized policy of setting 
emission standards. 
Suppose f, (xi ,v i )  is the cost function of the source i , where xi is an emission level 
and v = (v, , ... , v, ) is a random vector representing variables that affect the source costs. It is 
plausible to assume that under such circumstances the agency is able to compute only expected 
costs (xi) = Ef; (xi, vi). We assume the existence of all necessary integrals. For example, we 
can keep in mind the case that v has a finite number of values. 
Let us first look at a policy of setting emission standards. The minimum cost emission 
standard strategy for the environmental agency is found by solving the stochastic optimization 
problem: minimize 
subject to 
z h l x i h G  59, .  j = l ,  ..., rn, i = l ,  ..., n.  (11  > 
If expected costs F; (x) = E i  (x, V, ), i = 1,. . . ,n are convex functions, we can derive, 
using duality theory, the existence of pollution charges 1; = (h; ,...,A:) and emission charges 
u: = Em h;.hQ such that the least cost optimal strategy x: minimizes ]= I  
for ui = u,', i = 1, ... ,m. Equation (12) represents the agency's expectation of the emission 
reductions induced by charges u;. However, the agency's expectation of emissions will usually 
not coincide with the actual reactions of polluters. Since each polluter i knows the situation 
vi and costs at the source, he actually adjusts emission to the level xi (%, vi)  minimizing 
f;(x,vi)+uix, x 2 0 .  ( 1 3 )  
Therefore the environmental indicators r , (xk)  of the procedure (6) are calculated at 
random vector of emission levels xk = (x: ,..., xt ) minimizing cost functions (13) at random 
situations v: , i = 1,. . . , n. In this case procedure (6) generates a sequence hO, h' , . . . of random 
pollution charges and corresponding emission charges uO, u' , . . . . It can be shown (appendix 2) 
that the direction of movement r ( x k  ) = (TI (xk ), . . ., T, (xk )) in (6) is a stochastic subgradient of 
the following function yl(h),  which is similar to function y(h) defined by eq. (6): 
In other words , the vector T(xk) is obtained formally by taking the gradient (with respect to 
variables h = (h, ,..., h,) ) under the symbol of the mathematical expectation for observed 
k k V, ,. ..,vf: and calculated x: ,..., x,. More precisely, it is possible to show (appendix 2) that the 
random vector r ( x k )  is an unbiased estimate of a subgradient y i  of function y' (h) at h = A! : 
E[r(xk )lxk , hk ] = y: (hk ) , where E[. / .] is the conditional expectation symbol. 
From the convergence of the stochastic quasigradient (see, for example, Ermoliev and 
Wets (1987)) methods we can derive the convergence of the random sequence hO, A', . . . to the 
minimal value of the function yl(h) , h 2 0 .  The proof of this fact is close to the one given in 
the appendix 1. Let us show that the expected cost of the emission charge strategy 
u: = l i m x n  h:.h, is less then the expected costs of the emission standard strategy derived 
it+- I=' 
from the problem (10)-(1 1). 
It is easy to see that the minimization of y' (A) is a dual problem to the following: find 
emission vector x(v) = (x, (v), ... , x,, (v)) that minimizes the expectation functional 
subject to 
x:=lExi(~)hij 5 q j ,  j = l ,  ..., m, xi(v)20.  i = l ,  ..., n. ( 1 6 )  
Suppose that x*(.) is an optimal solution of this problem. Consider the Lagrange 
function 
The existence of a saddle point (x* (v), A*) such that 
L(x*(v), h)  5 L(x*(v),h*) 5 L(x(v),x) ( 17)  
for all x(v) 2 0, h 2 0 follows from the convexity of the function i ( . ,v i )  for any fixed v . 
Since decision x(-) in eqs. (15)-(16) depends on concrete situations v at sources, the optimal 
value of the objective functions in eqs.(15)-(16) is smaller then the optimal value of the 
objective function in eqs.(lO)-(1 1). Hence 
F (x* ) 2 F (x* (.)) = ~ ( x *  (v), X) = mar y ' (A). 
5. Uncertainty on transfer coeflicients. 
In the addition to the uncertainty involved in pollution control costs there exists 
uncertainty about transfer coefficients. Transmission of pollutants by air is affected by factors 
such as wind direction and speed and weather conditions. The concentration of effluents in 
water depends on the volume and velocity of the flow. It is plausible to assume that the source 
has better information on the specific conditions that determine the actual value of the transfer 
coefficients than the agency has. Let us show that in such situations the policy of pollution 
charges may be better than emission charges. 
Suppose that the agency is able to monitor values of random indicators 
r j ( ~ ) = z h 1 x i q U - q j ,  j= 1 ,.... n. 
On the basis of these values the agency pursues the pollution charges policy: it announces 
values of shadow prices h, instead of emission's taxes ui. 
Assume that each source i has better information on the transfer coefficients q,, rather 
than averaged values hU = Eq,,, for example, some conditional expectations G,, of q, given a 
particular weather situation at the source. We assume that each source i knows random values 
j 1 . m, and let w be the collection of all uncertainties 
w = {v, , sU ,  i = I,. . . n, j = 1.. . . m) Then the emission level is adjusted to the level minimizing 
The first term represents the direct cost of reducing emissions and the second term the 
expenditure of the polluter on pollution charges. 
In contrast to the situation described by the random function (13), each source now 
chooses optimal levels x: at an announced level of pollution charges h: on the basis of the 
information on events 5, and$ affecting the cost function 1. The resulting random vector 
r ( x k )  of the procedure (6) in this case is a stochastic subgradient (see appendix 2) of similar 
to y1 (A) function 
y2(') = Y(W)M z := l~ [ f ; (~ i (w) ,v i )+ (z ; l  h,~ij)y;(w)]-z;=, hjq, = 
From general results on the convergence of stochastic quasigradient methods it is 
possible again to derive the convergence with probability 1 of random sequence ho, h', ... 
generated by eq.(6) to the vector h* minimizing y2(h), h 2 0. It is easy to check that the 
minimization of y2(h), h 2 0 is a dual to the following problem: find an emission vector 
y (w) = ( y, ( w), . . . , y, (w)) minimizing the expectation functional 
subject to 
Let ( y* (a), h* ) be a saddle point of the corresponding Lagrange function L( y(a), A). 
The feasible solutions of the problem (16)-(17) are chosen independently of values {q,,}. 
Therefore for the optimal values ~ ( x *  (a)), ~ ( y *  ( a ) )  of problems (16)-(17), (2 1)-(22) the 
following inequality holds 
In other words, the pollution charge policy (19) leads up to more cost-effective average 
outcomes. 
6. A numerical example 
Acidification is one of the major problems in Europe and the Netherlands. Ammonia 
emissions are a major source of acid rain in the Netherlands are ammonia emissions. These 
emissions mainly result from livestock farming and fertilizer use and are generally transported 
over short distances (50% is deposited within 100 kilometers of the source). This implies that 
the major sources of ammonia deposition in the Netherlands are in the Netherlands, Belgium, 
France, Western Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom which contribute to 
four receptor areas (grid size 150 x 150 km). The Netherlands' policy is to reduce acid 
deposition to 2400 equivalents of acidlhectare in the year 2000 (VROM, [Ill). After 
subtracting the expected contribution from sulfur and nitrogen oxides in the year 2000, targets 
for ammonia deposition can be formulated for each grid (Table 1). 
For the adaptative charge mechanism data are needed on transfer coefficients and 
deposition levels. These levels can be simulated by solving subproblems (5) for each source 
and given current taxes u, or h, calculated according to the eqs.(7). Transfer coefficients for 
ammonia are based on European Program for Monitoring and Evaluation. (Sandnes and Styve, 
[8]). The transfer coefficients for the four Dutch receptors, based on the average meteorology 
for 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1990, are displayed in Table 2. The transfer coefficients 
clearly show the short travel distances of ammonia. For example, line 1 shows that a fraction 
0.366 (36.6%) of Belgian emissions is deposited in the Dutch receptor no. 3 (location 20-15) 
and only 0.3% of France's NH3 comes down in the same receptor. The costs for controlling 
ammonia emissions are based on the RAINS model of IIASA (Alcamo et al., [I]). RAINS 
stands for Regional Acidification Information and Simulation. RAINS distinguishes the 
following options for controlling ammonia emissions: low ammonia manure application, 
ammonia poor stable systems, covering manure storage, cleaning stable air, low nitrogen 
fodder and industrial stripping. For each country the potential and costs of their techniques are 
calculated accounting for country- and technology-specific factors (Klaassen, [6],[7]). These 
options are then compiled in national cost functions which rank the options according to their 
marginal costs and volume of emissions removed. 
To simulate the adaptative ambient charge mechanism, a computer program was 
written by V.Kirilyuk from V. Glushkov Institute of Cybernetics, Kiev, Ukraine.It is based on 
the package developed by A. Gaivoronski [5]. The program simulates the behavior of the 
environmental agency which maximizes, according to eq.(6), the Lagrange function y(h) on 
the basis of observed deposition levels. Differences between actual and target depositions 
(excess deposition) lead to changes in ambient (or deposition) charges. These changes are 
translated in emission charges using the transfer coefficient. The simulation assumes that the 
agency has imperfect knowledge of costs and perfect knowledge of transfer coefficients. The 
sources have perfect (deterministic) cost knowledge (as in section 3.). 
Two simulations were carried out: 
1. the agency starts with initial deposition charges of zero (scenario 1)  
2 the agency starts with a deposition charge of 100,000 DMkton NH3 deposited in grids 
3 and 4 (scenario 2). 
The reason for scenario 2 is that the agency knows immediately that without any 
control the deposition targets at receptors 1 and 2 are already met. Figures 1 and 2 show the 
values of both the total (annual) pollution control costs and the Lagrange function as a function 
of the number of iterations. Figure 1 shows that after 12 iterations the total cost and Lagrange 
function converges to around 2.9 billion DWyear (optimal value). Figure 2 clearly shows the 
impact of starting from an initial deposition charge of 100,000 DMIkton NH3 deposited at 
each receptor. In this case only seven iterations would be necessary to approach the cost- 
minimum solution. Such an initial charge could be set if the environmental agency would ask 
the individual source how they would respond to a certain emission charge before setting the 
initial charges. If sources would overestimate their emission reductions in order to reduce the 
charge level, the adaptation process would take longer and, as Figure 1 clearly indicates, costs 
would be higher than necessary during the period of adaptation. 
Figures 3 and 4 show the evolution of the emission charges over time for both 
scenarios. Obviously, starting from a zero charge would initially lead (see step 2) very high 
charges. This is especially so for Belgium and the Netherlands which have large impacts on the 
deposition at the receptors located in the Netherlands. For Belgium the charges would reach 
1596 x 1000 DWton NH3 at step 2 and would then gradually decrease to their final level of 72 
x 1000 DWton ammonia controlled. Such overshooting might cause problems. Firstly, during 
the adaptation period, charges and hence pollution control costs would be higher than 
necessary. Secondly, if the fixed costs element of pollution control costs is high, high charges 
may induce inflexibility since investments already taken are sunk costs. As Figure 5 shows, 
starting from a deposition charge level of 100,000 DMkton NH3 deposited at receptors 3 and 
4 would reduce the number of interactions to only seven. Moreover, the emission charges 
would not fluctuate greatly over time. After some (small) overshooting at step 1 and 
underscoring at step 2, the emission charges in all countries would gradually increase to the 
level where the deposition constraints are met at minimum costs. 
In conclusion, a system of adaptative deposition charges can be formulated that 
converges to the cost-minimum solution even if the environmental agency has imperfect 
knowledge on the costs. If some information on possible costs is available to the agency prior 
to setting the initial charge, the adaptation can proceed faster and lead to less significant 
fluctuations in costs and emission charge levels than if the agency starts with initial deposition 
charges equal to zero. 
7. Conclusions. 
This paper discussed the feasibility of an emission charge policy applied to non 
uniformly dispersed pollutants when the environmental authority's information on pollution 
control costs and transfer coefficients is uncertain. We have shown that, contrary to established 
opinion, the emission charge policy is both environmentally effective and cost effective. It has 
also been demonstrated that under cost uncertainty deposition targets can be met but pollution 
control cost will be lower if emission charges are imposed instead of emission standards. The 
pollution charges are more cost effective than emission charges when the uncertainty is 
involved in transfer coefficients. 
It has been shown that an adjustment mechanism can be designed which resembles a 
Walrasian process of "tatonnement". In a stepwise way taxes are adjusted such that ambient 
concentration converges to the target levels and simultaneously total costs of pollution control 
are minimized without the environmental agency having full information on costs andlor 
transfer coefficients. In a mathematical sense the procedure deals with the solution of the 
deterministic and stochastic minimax type problems. In the deterministic case this problem is 
equivalent to the original pollution control problem assuming the cost functions are convex. In 
general cases with stochastic costs and transfer coefficients the solution of the minimax 
problems leads to more cost effective policies than the emission standard strategy. Since the 
pollution control costs are unknown to the environmental authority the proposed adjustment 
mechanisms are based on non-monotonic (deterministic and stochastic) techniques. By starting 
from an arbitrary chosen vector of shadow prices, which are translated into emission taxes, the 
authority observes the emission (or deposition) levels of polluters and assesses also the 
environmental effectiveness of the solution by calculating the gaps between actual depositions 
and deposition targets. When discrepancies are observed, shadow prices and corresponding 
emission taxes are adjusted according to eq.(8) until all gaps are closed. The vector of 
emissions then is both cost effective and environmentally effective. 
Let us notice that this procedure can also be viewed as a "dialog" between the 
environmental agency and polluters to investigate optimal taxes in order to avoid possible 
troubles with investment in the case of overshooting taxes. The agency announces current 
taxes and polluters report corresponding levels of emissions to the agency. The agency adjusts 
taxes according to the proposed adjustment rule and announces new taxes and so on. Such a 
preliminary, possibly highly computerized, dialog may provide a fairly accurate approximation 
of taxes to be implemented in practice. 
Our conclusion from the result is that there is no real difference in the applicability of 
emission taxes, whether the environmental targets are formulated in terms of the emission goal 
or as a set of ambient concentration standards. Under both types of environmental policy 
emission charges can be applied as an instrument that is both cost and environmentally 
effective and that is superior to an emission standard policy that could be environmentally 
effective but less cost effective. 
Table 1. Ammonia targets (kton NH3Igridlyr) 
1) Infeasible. For calculation increased to 45. 
Table 2. Transfer coefficients (fraction of emissions deposited at receptor sites) 
Receptor 
EMEP x/y 
Source 
BEL 
1 
(19-15) 
0.1 16 
2 
(19-16) 
0.142 
3 
(20- 1 5) 
0.366 
4 
(20- 1 6) 
0.269 
Figure 1. Total costs and Lagrange function (106 DMIyr) with zero initial charges (scenario 1) 
- Total costs 
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Figure 2. Total costs and Lagrange function (106 DMIyr) with zero initial charges (scenario 2) 
Figure 3a. Emission charges (1000 DWton) with scenario (1) (iteration 1 - 5 )  
BEL FRA FRG IRE LUX U K NET 
Figure 3b. Emission charges (1000 DMJton) with scenario (1) (iteration 6 - 12) 
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Figure 4. Emission charges (1000 DM/ton) with scenario 2 (iteration 1 - 7) 
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Appendix 1. 
Asymptotic properties of the adjustment mechanisms. 
Various requirements on the convergence of sequences hl, h2,. . . and xO, x1 , . . . generated 
by rules (6),(8)-(9) can be derived from rather general results on the convergence of stochastic 
quasigradient methods (see, for example, Ermoliev and Wets [4]). Let us outline the proof only 
for the case where T(xk ) is the deterministic vector and the sequence p,, p,, ... satisfies the 
condition 
in particular, pk = c l  k with c constant. 
Suppose that p,, k = 0,1, ... satisfy conditions (23). We imply also the existence of 
optimal solutions xO, x' , . . . defined according to eq.(S). Then the sequence of defined by the 
rule (9), converges to the optimal dual variables (taxes) h* =(h;,...,h:). If in addition 
xlk , k = 0, 1, . ..is the unique solution of the minimization problem (5) and f ;  are convex 
functions then the sequence xp , x,! , . . . converges to the cost effective emissions x,* , i = I,. . . , n. 
Proof. From the projection operation definition follows that 
where 11 - I denotes the Euclidean norm and (a,b) is the scalar product of vectors a and b. Since 
r ( x k )  is a subgradient of the concave function y(h) at hk then for any vector h : 
and hence 
w h e r e y ( ~ )  = max y (h) .Therefore from the inequality (24) we have 
120 
From the problem formulation follows that x,(h) l x,(O) for each i=l, ... n and h 2 0. 
Therefore, we can assume that IIr'(xk)l1 < const. In other words for some constant C 
2 
Define 6 ,  = Ilh* - hk 1 1  + C x W  S= lr p: . From the above inequality follows that Sk+,  5 6, 
and hence the sequence {6,} converges. Since zw L =O p i  c - the sequence {llh* -hkl12} is also 
convergent. From inequality (24) and taking into account that IIr(xk)ll c C (for some constant 
C) we have 
oiHh* - T I ~ '  - 2 x w  k=O p k ( ~ ( ~ k ) , h *  - h k ) + c z w  k=o p i  
Hence z- pk(r (xk) ,h*  -hk) c -. Since x- pk = -, there exists a sequence {hki} such that 
k=O k=O 
(r(xki ) ,h* -hkl) + 0 ,  I + -. Therefore y(hkl) + y(h*), I + -. 
From this fact and the convergence of the sequence {~lh* -hkl12} follows the desired 
result: hk + A*, k + DO. 
Suppose 4 are convex functions. Consider now the sequence of emissions: 
xk = urgmin L(x ,hk)  , where L(x,h)  is the Lagrange function of the pollution control 
120 
k problem. In other words, each component xjk of the vector xk = (x: , . . . , x,, ) is the solution of 
the subproblem (5)  for h, = h:, j = 1, ... ,m. Let us show that xk + x*,  k + - 
From the definition of y(h) we have L(xk ,hk )=  y (hk)  . From the convergence 
hk +A*, k + - and the inequality (25) follows that y(hk)+ y(h*). Therefore from the 
duality theory follows that 
L(xk ,Ak)  = y (hk )  + y(h*) = L(x*,h*). 
Suppose that xk does not converge to x*,  that is to say there exists a sequence 
xki + E f x*.  hen 
L(xki , hki ) = argmin ~ ( x ,  hki )+ L(Y, A*) 
120 
Since x* = urgmin L(x ,  h*) is uniquely defined, Y = x*. The contradiction completes the proof. 
xZO 
Appendix 2. On the calculation of stochastic subgradients. 
Functions y (h ) ,  y l (h ) ,  y 2 ( h )  belong to the following family of functions. Suppose 
cp(x, h ,0)  is a function defined on x E Rn , h E Rn and 0 E 0,  where (0,3, P )  is a probability 
space. Assume that (p(x,.,8) is a concave continuously differentiable function, cp ,  is its 
gradient and there exist all necessary integrals which are considered further. 
Consider maximization of the function 
g(h) = E min ~[cp(x ,  A, e)lA] = ~rp(x (h ,  w), h ,  8 )  
where E[cp1A] is the conditional expectation with respect to a given family of events 
o E A c 9. Let us show that the vector 
5 = c p i  (x.  h,e)l x=x,A,wl 
is an unbiased estimate of a subgradient g,  (stochastic subgradient of g,): 
g ( p )  - g(h) 5 (E[%lh],p -A )  9 w. 
Indeed from the concavity of cp(x,., 8 )  follows 
E[cp(x(p, w), p, e)lA] - ~[cp(x(h ,  w), h,e)lA] 5 
E [ v ( x ( ~ ,  w)p, ~ ) I A ]  - E [ v ( x ( ~ ,  w), h , e~A)]  5 (E[cp,(h, w), A, el A], p -A) .  
The desired result follows now by taking the conditional expectation (for fixed p, h )  in both 
sides of this inequality: g ( p )  - g(h) 5 (~ip, (x (h ,  w), h ,  8), p - h) .  
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